

---

*Saving lives and costs: a contribution to the sustainability of health care*


# Driving Change in Health Care – A quality agenda

---

## ***Curative care: Our starting point (pre 2006)***

- Tradition of private initiative
  - Hospitals, nursery homes privately owned
  - Medical specialists and general practitioners mostly private entrepreneurs
- Mixed public/private insurance
  - 60% social insurance (below average income level)
  - 30% private insurance (no government interference)
  - 10% civil servants, elderly, etc.
- Growing government interference (from ± 1980 onwards)
  - Main objective: Cost containment
  - Detailed price regulation, budgeting
  - National, and regional planning, and licensing


## *System-related problems stressed the need for reform*




# *The question of productivity became increasingly urgent given the tight labor market*

**Labor scarcity in *future* may put additional pressure on cost**

(Labor deficit health care 2010–2025)



**Salary explosion from the past are illustrative of this may increase health care costs**



Sources: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis; ZIP innovatie; Strategy& analysis

# *The 2005–2006 reform intended to boost productivity in an inefficient health care system*


## **System pre-2006: macro effective but micro inefficient**

- Effective macro instrument
  - Cost containment on macro (national) level
  - Policy implementation through intervening in the system
- But problematic on the micro level
  - Micro inefficiency
  - Lack of spirit of enterprise and innovative climate
  - Rationing → waiting lists

## **Growing pressure on the system to change**

- Social problems: waiting lists
- More costs
- Political strains
- Law suits


## **The 2005-06 reform: More efficiency to accommodate volume**



- Volume growth is a fact of life: Ageing, innovation
- More efficiency is needed to deal with volume growth
- Competition will lead to more efficiency and lower prices

# *We envisioned competitive dynamics contributing to cost control and quality of care*

## The competition model



- **Room to move**
  - Freedom of nominal premium setting
  - Freedom to offer supplementary deductibles, group discounts, and extra insurance
  - Freedom of contracting (insurer ↔ health care provider)
  - Freedom of price negotiations
  - Freedom of capital investments (capital costs in DRG's)
- **Changed incentives and responsibilities**
  - From budgeting to output pricing/p4p
  - Insurers and providers have to compete for clients
  - Quality indicators for hospital and outpatient care
  - Increase amount of risk of insurers and providers
  - Duty of care for health insurers
- **Clear government safeguards**
  - Compulsory acceptance for basic insurance
  - Compulsory health insurance and income related subsidy
  - Legally defined coverage of basis insurance
  - No premium differentiation between insured
  - Health Care Authority (market development, price regulation)
  - Health Insurance Board (package of entitlements, risk equalization)


---

## ***The health care reform has been successful***

- Waiting lists have been virtually eliminated
- Substantial increase in transparency as a result of DRGs
  - Better view on real costs of treatment
  - Better registrations
  - Better view on practice variation
- Prices have decreased
- And ... we are increasingly capable of controlling volume growth

# Negotiations for the free DRG segment resulted in lower prices

Price development hospital DBCs 2006-2010 (% nominal)




Sources: Marktscan Medisch Specialistische Zorg 2011; Nza. Onderhandelen over ziekenhuiszorg; Vektis 2009



# Health care reform succeeded in lowering prices, but it did not curb volume growth


Total growth in hospital expenditures (%)<sup>1)</sup>



## The 2005-2006 Reform Paradigm


- Volume growth is a fact of life: ageing, innovation
- More efficiency is needed to deal with volume growth
- Competition will lead to more efficiency and lower prices

Price increase (%)



- Health care reform (competition) has indeed led to lower prices (driven by B-segment)

Volume growth (%)



- But since the health care reform volume growth accelerated
- **Today's challenge:** volume growth reduction without the waiting lists of the nineties

1) Hospital expenditure include day and/or night cost and include specialist health care (4) Estimate based on "Marktscan Medisch specialistische zorg 2011"

2) Consumer Price Index CBS

Sources: CBS Statline (Zorgrekeningen; expenditures at current and constant cost); RIVM Performance Of Dutch Health Care 2010; Stijging Zorgkosten ontrafeld; VGE; Marktscan Medisch specialistische zorg 2011; BoStrategy& analysis

# *The US experience also suggests controlling prices may focus on the wrong part of the equation*




## Example US Medicare

- Medicare has committed significant effort to figuring out the “ideal” price paid per unit of service to curb spending, when **use rate** is actually the more important variable

$$\text{Total Cost} = \text{Price} \times \text{Use Rate}$$


- The use rate is a direct function of the medical practice style in the delivery system

## Growth (%) in physician fees compared with growth in total expenditures



Sources: Mayo Clinic - Robert Smoldt

## *The Medicare price control cycle: cutting prices drives volume up*




Sources: Mayo Clinic - Robert Smoldt

# Usage is not a US problem: Higher rates in NL for hip replacements, TURPs and tonsillectomies

## Incidence rates in the Netherlands and the USA


Number of treatments per 1000 population




Sources: 1) OECD 2009, 2) NL: DIS 2006-2007; USA: HCUP 2006, 3) Laparoscopic versus small-incision cholecystectomy, F.Keus, 2008, 4) NL: DIS 2006-2007; USA: CDC 2010

# The US is not an outlier in health usage – Budget based German health care ranks high


Hip replacement surgery, per 1000 population, 2009<sup>1)</sup>




Knee replacement surgery, per 1000 population, 2008<sup>1)</sup>



Coronary angioplasty (PCI), per 1000 population, 2009<sup>1)</sup>




Caesarean sections per 100 live births, 2009<sup>1)</sup>



1) Or nearest year

Source: OECD, Strategy& analysis

# Ageing is often blamed for volume growth. Wrong!



1) Volume growth is based on CBS total hospital and specialist expenditure figures at constant cost


2) Defined as total hospital and specialist expenditure figures at constant cost divided by the total number of admissions

3) Isolated effect of population ageing on driver

Sources: CBS Statline (Gezondheid en Welzijn); RIVM Performance of Dutch Health Care 2010; Kosten van Ziekten 2005; Strategy& analysis

# Over the next 15 years, ageing will continue to drive volume, but yearly impact does not exceed 1%

**Forecasted population ageing and growth**  
(In Mn people)



15.3%

19.9%


24.2%

27.1%

26.3%

Share 65+ in total population

**Estimated impact of ageing on yearly volume growth (%)**




- Hence, a strong need to reduce any volume growth on top of ageing

Sources: United Nations; Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Strategy& analysis

# *The challenges to overcome for the payors*

**We pay volume instead of quality**


**We pay in a fragmented way**



Source: Strategy&



***Acceptable medical practice is an enormous grey area – offering lots of room to respond to price and volume incentives and to counter disruptive innovations***



*The human body is a nearly endless source of revenues” – A medical specialist*

---

# *We may be inclined to overestimate the effectiveness of medical care*

## Attitude of an average patient

1

Ever increasing  
(early) diagnostic  
capabilities

- It is better to know
- The earlier you know the better

2

Evidence for  
every day care

- If the doctor offers it, it will be effective
- No harm in trying

3


Alignment doctor  
and patient  
preferences

- The doctor will know what is best for me

# Over diagnosis is a real-risk; example lung cancer screening

**Smokers are at 17 times higher risk of death as a result of lung cancer**  
Number of deaths per 1,000 over five years


**But the number of abnormalities identified spiral CT diagnosis of lung cancer is similar for smokers and non-smokers**  
Diagnosed cancer per 1,000 scans



Sources: Over diagnosed (Welch); Strategy& analysis

# Over diagnosis for kidney cancer?

**New kidney cancer diagnoses and deaths**  
Per 100,000 people




Sources: "Over diagnosed"; Welch; Strategy& analysis


# What about other cancers?

## Cancer and diagnoses U.S.


**Skin Cancer** Per 100,000




**Pancreas cancer** Per 100,000



**Prostate Cancer** Per 100,000



**Breast Cancer** Per 100,000




# *Results from a 25 year randomized clinical trial in Canada suggest that breast cancer screening does not save lives*

	<b>Breast exams</b>	<b>Breast exams and mammography</b>
<b>Population</b>	<b>44.910 women</b>	<b>44.925 women</b>
<b>Diagnoses with breast cancer</b>	<b>3.133 women</b>	<b>3.250 women</b>
<b>Died with breast cancer</b>	<b>500 women</b>	<b>505 women</b>

*‘And the screening had harms: One in five cancers found with mammography and treated was not a threat to the woman’s health and did not need treatment such as chemotherapy, surgery or radiation’*

# *Screening for dementia: are patients aware that they are risking to be overdiagnosed*

## A BMJ study



# *We may be inclined to overestimate the effectiveness of medical care*

## Attitude of an average patient

1

Ever increasing  
(early) diagnostic  
capabilities

- It is better to know
- The earlier you know the better

2

Evidence for  
every day care

- If the doctor offers it, it will be effective
- No harm in trying

3

Alignment doctor  
and patient  
preferences


- The doctor will know what is best for me



# No evidence for more than half of our common medical treatments

51% of ~3,000 commonly used treatments in the U.K. Was of unknown effectiveness

Rating by a team of advisors, peer reviewers, experts, information specialists, and statisticians




Note: Study based on ~ 3,000 treatments

Sources: Clinical Evidence website 2011; How much of orthodox medicine is evidence based? 2007; Strategy& analysis

# Practice variation for common elective surgeries

Indexed between hospitals in 2009<sup>1)</sup>




X% High practice variation  
X% Above average practice variation  
X% Low practice variation

1) Corrected for Sex, Age, and SES 2) Difference between p25 and p75 > 50% are regarded high practice variation, differences > 25% and < 50% are regarded mediocre variations Note: Hospitals with 10 or less operative DBC's are not taken into account Sources: Rapport indicator indication setting Plexus; Strategy& analysis

# Practice variation is common in health care – Also in The Netherlands


## Risk adjusted conversion ratio benign prostatic hyperplasia per hospital

Number of surgeries per 1,000 BPH-patients per year



## Risk adjusted conversion ratio cataract surgeries

Number surgeries per 1,000 cataract patients



The differences between high and low conversion ratio's are too large to be interpreted as care of the same quality


■ Academic institutions    — Average  
**Hospitals (in The Netherlands)**

Source: Plexus

# Practice variation is as much a Dutch problem as a US problem

## Practice variation

Systemic Component of Variation (SCV) – 2006-2007




Note: NL variation determined over about 450 municipalities. Population corrected for age and income differences; USA variation determined over average treatment rates per Hospital Referral Region (200). Population corrected for age, sex and race differences

Source: Plexus 'Voorstudie naar praktijkvariatie in Nederland', Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, Strategy& analysis

# Supply induced demand, and investing in health care does not necessarily buy quality


## Mortality rates are higher for higher healthcare spending regions

Adjusted relative risk for death during follow up for every 10% spending increase




## Patient-reported quality is lower for higher healthcare spending regions

Change in satisfaction relative to quintile 1 in percentage points




## Physicians perception of quality is lower for higher healthcare spending regions

% of 10.000 interviewed physicians



## HCI index is higher for higher spending regions. However more patient rate their health care negatively



Note: HCI index measured by inpatient care intensity. Calculated as the simple average of the ratios to the national average of time spent in the hospital and the number of inpatient physician visits

Source: The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice - Health Care Spending, Quality and Outcomes; Booz & Company analysis

Prepared for VGZ

# *We may be inclined to overestimate the effectiveness of medical care*

## Attitude of an Average Patient

1

Ever increasing  
(early) diagnostic  
capabilities

- It is better to know
- The earlier you know the better

2

Evidence for  
every day care

- If the doctor offers it, it will be effective
- No harm in trying


3

Alignment doctor  
and patient  
preferences

- The doctor will know what is best for me

# Patients usually chose differently (and more conservatively) than their doctors

## Change in number of treatments after shared decision making with simple decision aids



Source: The Cochrane Collaboration (Wolf; 1996; Volk; 1999; Man-Son-Hing; 1999; Morgan; 2000; Dodin; 2001; Auvinen; 2002; Frosch; 2003; Whelan; 2004); Strategy & analysis

---


*Saving lives and costs*

Enhancing the quality and appropriateness of care has the potential to lower costs and increase the sustainability of health care



## Decision aid also have substantial impact in practice

Informed patients choose more conservatively (~9500 patients in Washington State)



12-22% lower costs

### Nijmegen: IVF Patiënten kiezen vaker voor de doelmatige optie

- Keuze tussen dubbele embryo transfer (hogere zwangerschap kans, ook hogere kans op medische complicaties van meerling) en single embryo transfer
- Cyclus 1: 43% van de patiënten voor een single transfer versus 32% in de controlegroep
- Cyclus 2: 26% van de patiënten voor een single transfer versus 16% in de controlegroep


# Person centered care increase quality and lowers costs: Example hip fractures Sweden

## Patient centred care for Hip fractures

- Care pathway tailored to the individual's needs
- Starting point: Tailored to the patient's needs?
  - What was the patient capable of before the fracture?
  - What is the social network of the patient?
  - What are her objective in life?
  - Which steps to independence are mostly valued (e.g., taking care of personal hygiene)
- Differentiated care for different personality types, e.g.,
  - Autonomous patients
  - Modest patients
  - Detached people



### Fewer hospital days



### Successful rehabilitation




### Lower costs (€)



Source: Patients with acute hip fractures, motivation, effectiveness, and costs in two different care systems

# Patient centeredness is especially important in end of life settings

Quality of live and health care costs last week of life (2008, US\$)




Source: Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life, 2009; Strategy& analysis

# End of life care can actually increase life


## Hospice care increases survival time <sup>1)</sup> ...

Average number of survival days after diagnosis



## ... as does early palliative care <sup>2)</sup>

Average number of survival days after diagnosis



■ Non-hospice care ■ Hospice care

1) n = 4493

2) n = 151

Source: Comparing hospice and non-hospice patient survival among patients who die within a three-year window; Journal of pain and symptom management; March 2007; Early palliative care for patients with metastatic non-small-cell lung cancer; The new England journal of medicine; 2010; Strategy& analysis

## *The 2005-2006 reform paradigm: Lower prices via competition to pay for inevitable volume growth*


### System pre-2006: Macro effective but micro inefficient

- Effective macro instrument
  - Cost containment on macro (national) level
  - Policy implementation through intervening in the system
- But problematic on the micro level
  - Micro inefficiency
  - Lack of spirit of enterprise & innovative climate
  - Rationing → waiting lists

### Growing pressure on the system to change

- Cost growth
- Demographics (ageing and labour market)
- Technology developments
- Law suits

### The 2005-06 reform: More efficiency to accommodate volume




- Volume growth is a fact of life: ageing, innovation
- More efficiency is needed to deal with volume growth
- Competition will lead to more efficiency and lower prices

*We see health care systems move continuously in between forms of budgeting and fee for service*

Pay for services


Budgeting



# *The challenges to overcome for the payors*

**We pay volume instead of quality**


**We pay in a fragmented way**




*Bron: Strategy&*

# *The challenge is to use contracting and reimbursement to create a flywheel from quality*

The doom circle of efficiency



Quality as flywheel for better health care







# *Fragmentation needs to be solved in order to capture the benefits of investing in quality*

## The theoretical business case versus the fragmented business case

Illustrative money flows



## ***But hospitals investing quality will see a revenue reduction***




---

## *Three levers for reimbursement and contracting*

### **New product definitions**

- E.g. shared decision making consultations, therapy adherence



### **Reimburse differently**

- Shared savings
- Transition paths

### **Contract selectively and in a differentiated way**

- Steer patients to Quality
- Provides



# Example of redefining product definitions in order to encompass quality instead of volume

## Performance definitions


- 1 Medication dispensing (Receptregel)**
  - Distribute prescription medication in standard/weekly form
  - Check correctness/safety of prescription
- 2 Medication instructions**
  - Provide usage instructions in case of first time issuance or non-compliance with user instructions
- 3 Medication review**
  - Periodically review individual (elderly) medication therapy of patients with chronic medication use
- 4 Continuity of care hospitalization**
  - Conduct one-on-one interview with patient
  - Ensure correct transition of medication details to other providers of care
- 5 Continuity of care discharge**
  - Conduct one-on-one interview with patient
  - Provide clear guidance on medication therapy, including changes due to hospitalization
- 6 Self management education**
  - Provide education in group format on self-management to optimize medication utilization (medication adherence/ utilization)
- 7 Self management counseling**
  - Provide counseling per individual patient's request on potential drug-drug interactions in medication therapy (e.g., combination prescription/OTC)
- 8 Medication related travel counseling**
  - Provide counseling per individual patient's request on medication utilization and storage during travelling
- 9 Disease prevention travel counseling**
  - Provide information per individual patient's request on risk of diseases for certain travel destinations
- 10 Mutual services**
  - Support other healthcare providers in execution of activities as defined under performance definitions



# *Paying for quality instead of volume can result in higher prices but lower costs: The need for sophisticated “products”*

## Objective to control volume with quality initiatives

Not care rationing



## Incentivized by product definitions

- Need to counter the volume incentive in the system
  - Income compensation
  - Compensation for extra cost (e.g., admin, IT)
- Need for hard – inescapable – volume agreements
  - To eliminate leak-away effects at the level of the participating and non-participating hospitals
- Benefits can be used by the hospital for more quality improvement investments
- Every 1% decline in hospital volume frees up €200Mn





## Connecting quality and financing in contracting policies



Source: Strategy& analysis